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During the first decade of the twentieth century, governments 
in various parts of the world were becoming increasingly concerned 
about the well-being of the men who worked in deep mines. 
Following a report by Dr J.S. Haldane on the health of Cornish 
miners, the Transvaal Medical Society pubhshed a report on miners' 
phthisis in May 1903.' In February 1905 the Western Austrahan 
government issued a report of its Royal Commission on the Ventilation 
and Sanitation of Mines and in October of the same 
year Dr Thomas Oliver reported in the British Medical Journal 
on his investigations into miners' phthisis on the Rand. The 
following year Dr Walter Summons conducted an inquiry into that 
disease at Bendigo, making his findings public during 1907. He 
revealed that, between 1875 and 1906, 1402 Bendigo quartz miners 
had died from respiratory diseases as opposed to a mere 272 deaths 
from mining accidents.2 In 1907 the Queensland government 
appointed a Royal Commission into the Health of Miners^ which 
reported in 1911 that "the general health of the men who were 
actually at work when examined was exceedingly good. It may 
safely be said that the general body of working miners seen would 
compare favourably in point of physique with any similar class 
of men in the State.... The sole direction in which the miners examined 
appeared as a class to differ from any other class of 
workmen pursuing an ordinary manual industry consisted in the 
tendency to special pulmonary diseases"." The report was detailed 
and of undoubted value to researchers interested in the welfare 
of Queensland miners in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Its conclusions, however, should be treated with caution 
since they were reached by examining workmen at the face and 
comparing their health with that of the non-miners within the same 
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community. In one North Queensland mining town at least, the 
real victims of the mines were not only those who suffered from 
the "miners' complaint", but also the disabled men no longer 
working, the typhoid patients for whom the civic authorities 
accepted responsibility and the men, women and children infected 
with tuberculosis and other chest ailments. Charters Towers provides 
a sound case study. 
Situated about 130 kilometres south-west of Townsville in North 
Queensland, Charters Towers was discovered late in 1871. The 
goldfield has yielded some seven miUion fine ounces of gold, over 
a milhon ounces of silver and four thousand tons of lead. Most 
was won between 1872 and 1917, with peak production in 1899. 
Throughout this period the Towers was a dangerous place to work. 
Though ignorance, incompetence and managerial cupidity 
contributed to this, part of the problem was the field itself. The 
country rock was a hard grey grano-diorite, traversed by many 
fault and joint planes (called 'heads' by the miners) which made 
parts of the ground unstable. The lodes were wide and both the 
direction and the angle of dip were unpredictable. Because there 
were no alluvial deposits small syndicates, with neither capital nor 
expertise, were soon forced to sink shafts. Underlies were popular 
but vertical shafts not uncommon. These were nearly always sunk 
by contract in a single operation from 'grass' to the lode, which 
was then followed by an underlie. Since there was no sloping carried 
out during the sinking, the syndicates did not build penthouses 
and the contractors hoisted the broken rock through the single 
compartment in one lift. The sinkers avoided falling debris by 
crouching against the walls of the shaft! 
MINING METHODS 
Once sloping began miners were protected by two trap doors 
set, in the Cornish fashion, to open upwards as the bucket rose 
and to be closed by a hand lever from the brace. Even so, shaft 
mishaps remained common. In many mines hoisting equipment 
was primitive; there were stiU twenty-three whips and five whims 
on the field in 1886. A miner was killed at the Golden Gate by 
an iron column dropping from the shng in which it was being 
lowered down the shaft as a result of such inadequacies.5 Transport 
for the men was as primitive as it was for the ore. Tired miners 
missed their footing on perpendicular ladders^ and, even in the 
mid-eighties, centipede (or Jacob's) ladders, consisting of a single 
pole into which wooden pegs were driven at intervals, were far 
from rare.^ At this time safety cages were unknown on Charters 
Towers.^ Partly because the Mines Regulafion Act of 1889' increased 
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the cost of such equipment without insisting on its use, they were 
adopted only slowly. There were still but three cages on the field in 1890, 
rising to nine by the turn of the century.'" In 1901 McLaren noted that, 
in the Brilhant Deep Levels, the only transport for miners in the 2,556 
foot shaft was a bucket, innocent of guides or even a swivel hook." 
Where modern winding gear had been introduced, improper 
maintenance rendered some shafts unsafe. In the Brilliant Central 
early in 1903 an ill-adjusted brake on the winding drum dropped 
a safety cage containing six miners.'2 More common was the 
breaking of steel ropes greased with heavy lubricants which did 
not penetrate their inner fibres'3; during 1902 this caused six 
accidents, in two of which men died. Signals too remained a source 
of danger in the shafts. In particular the use of one knock to indicate 
both "stop" and "hoist" caused confusion; three accidents, two fatal, 
were directly attributable to this practice in 1903.'" In the period 
1891 to 1910, fifty-five deaths and 219 injuries occurred in the shafts, 
winzes and passes of the Charters Towers mines. These constituted 
thirty-three per cent of all casualties as opposed to Queensland 
metalliferous mines overall where only twenty-eight per cent of 
accidents were so caused. 
A wide-spread ignorance of the properties of explosives cost many 
miners their lives. When the first Northern Mining Inspector, Joseph 
H»# ^^ .J» li.r,,, . : ' 
Going on shift at the Day Dawn P.C, descending the incline shaft in 1891. 
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Shakespeare, was appointed in early 1883 he discovered that it 
was not uncommon for up to 300 pounds of unprotected explosives 
to be stored underground where they could only be approached 
by the light of a candle.'^ "Black powder" was frequently rammed 
home with metal tamping bars, and it was fairly common for powder 
to be used in conjunction with the newly invented dynamite. Indeed, 
one accident investigation revealed that the dead miner had used 
two plugs of dynamite topped with powder and rammed down 
with a copper rod.'^ Even more spectacular was an accident in 
which five pounds of explosives, which had been lying discarded 
at the North Queen blacksmith's shop, were recognised as 
potentially dangerous and dropped into a bucket of water, probably 
on the assumption that dynamite, like black powder, would not 
react with damp. After twenty-four hours the then harmless plugs 
were carefully disposed of and the water into which their nitro-
glycerine content had leached was thrown into the blacksmith's 
cooling tub where it killed the first man who tried to temper a 
tool.'7 
INADEQUATE MANAGEMENT 
There can be little doubt that low managerial standards caused 
many of the safety problems. Weighting the safety valves of the 
boilers, for instance, was common practice,'* and the failure of 
companies to lodge plans of their underground workings with the 
Mines Department horrified visitors from other fields. Certainly 
the lack of any complete map of the field was responsible for many 
accidents. As early as 1877 several tons of water broke, without 
warning,-into the North Austraha;'^ the following year three men 
were drowned in a similar accident at the Identity.20 Two other 
catastrophies occurred early the foUowing decade, and in 1884 a 
group of miners unexpectedly cut into the disused workings of 
an adjacent mine. The old drive was full of decomposed timber 
gas which exploded on contact with the miners' candles.2' 
Nevertheless, management was rarely blamed. Accidents at the face 
were thought to be caused by the carelessness of the victims, while 
falls of rock from the walls or shafts were seen as inevitable hazards 
of gold mining. Thus an inquiry into an accident at the Day Dawn 
PC in March 1882, when a body of stone 120 feet long feh killing 
two men, heard evidence that was damning to the manager. Despite 
three rock falls during the preceding five weeks, in two of which 
miners had been injured, the reef had been undercut leaving the 
hanging wall without timber to support it. Even so, the inquiry 
found there had been no negligence.22 
Indeed successive laws afforded little protection. The first mines 
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safety regulations were brought down in 1881.23 These controlled 
ventilation, the use of explosives and the fencing and staging of 
shafts, and provided for mine inspection. More importantly for 
the families of disabled miners, the regulations made it technically 
possible for the Inspector of Mines to prosecute mine managers 
for negligence leading to injury or death. In the event of a conviction, 
the fine imposed could be awarded the victim.2" However, since 
the legislation covered only those mines employing six or more 
men, it neglected the smaller, least well-equipped and therefore 
the most dangerous concerns. As late as 1887 only sixty-five of 
the 157 mines on Charters Towers came under its provisions.25 Even 
more disappointingly, in order to obtain a conviction the inspector 
not only had to prove negligence but also had to estabhsh the 
existence of a manager to whom it might be attributed. As the 
Warden reported, "if any responsibility has to be taken, nobody 
is the manager."2'' When the legislation was repealed in 1889, only 
four prosecutions had been instituted at Charters Towers; the 
maximum fine imposed was two pounds. No damages had been 
awarded the injured miners. 
During 1886 an Employers' Liability Act^^ provided for 
compensation. However it too was ineffective in the mining industry 
owing to Section Five which removed liability in any case where 
the workman had been careless, had not obeyed instructions or 
knew of, and had failed to report, defective conditions or equipment. 
Evidence that at least one of these conditions was present was 
given at virtually every accident inquiry heard after this date. In 
1889 some of the deficiencies of the 1881 legislation were remedied 
when the Mines Regulation Act brought the small mines under 
the supervision of the Inspector and insisted on the registration 
of mine managers. It also placed some restrictions on machinery 
operators. However the legislation remained incapable of 
controlling the operations of a field such as Charters Towers. This 
was reflected in the death and injury figures which, for the two 
decades from 1890 to 1910, were consistently higher, in proportion 
to the number of miners employed, than for the colony in general.2* 
Further, it was not until the Workers Compensation Act of 1905 
that any major change in the official approach to the victims of 
mining accidents can be discerned. The first compensation cases 
(eight deaths and thirty injuries) were fought in the SmaU Debts 
Court during 1907. Decisions were reached on the basis of need 
not culpability.29 Though a new era was dawning, the Act was 
not retrospective and the human consequences of four decades of 
mining could not be ascertained by the Commissioners at the work 
face. The victims were in the bark and iron humpies on the outskirts 
of this prosperous mining town. 
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POOR HYGIENE STANDARDS 
Another area where the mine owners evaded the results of 
mismanagement was that of typhoid and other enteric diseases. This 
was because responsibility was assumed by the civic authorites who 
waged a long and often unsuccessful war on these diseases. The 
Municipal Council's basic problem was lack of water. Charters Towers 
is dry and very hot and its sparse water resources were quickly used up 
or polluted by the mines and mihs. During the 1870s and 1880s most 
drinking water was collected in corrugated iron tanks erected outside 
houses. When, as frequently happened on Charters Towers, the rainfall 
was not sufficient to fill the tanks, residents resorted to wells dug in flats 
which were often polluted by seepage from the town's cesspits.^ o As a 
result, each dry season brought with it epidemics, the most serious of 
which was typhoid.3' Hospital records show that overwhelmingly more 
patients were hospitalised from this disease than from any other cause.32 
In 1885, when only nine inches of rain were recorded, the death rate was 
thirty per thousand, alarmingly high considering the low average age 
of a mining population and the reputed healthiness of the town's 
geographical location.^^ After a vain appeal to the colonial government 
for £50,000 to establish a town water supply^" the local authorities 
attempted to ease the situation by railing 7,000 gaUons of drinking water 
a day from the Burdekin River. ^ 5 
During the 1880s the Council won some victories. It set up a 
Health Committee and appointed an Inspector of Nuisances. 
Though much of his time was spent harrassing Chinese storekeepers 
and rounding up stray goats, much needed improvements to hygiene 
standards were enforced. The Health Committee was, for instance, 
at the centre of a protracted public debate on the town's sanitary 
problems, during which much fact and fantasy was aired concerning 
the respective merits of the single or double pan systems versus 
the "deep pit".^* This was eventually resolved in favour of a double 
pan system which provided for the steam cleaning of the emptied 
pans. Nevertheless it was not until 1887 that the Charters Towers 
Waterworks Board was set up jointly by the municipal authority 
and the neighbouring Dalrymple Divisional Board. After a great 
deal of discussion about engineering and the borrowing of nearly 
£80,000, the town's first reticulated water services were in place 
by December 1890. The system allowed for the daily consumption 
of fifty gallons per head of population. So long as there was water 
in the Burdekin River, householders in the surveyed area at least 
were relatively well served." Problems of failure of the river however 
were not solved until 1902 when the Burdekin Weir was completed. 
Thus in 1903 Charters Towers had ample supplies of clean water 
and a sanitary system which should have been adequate for a town 
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Miners working in the heat of the 2150 feet level of the Brilliant Extended Mine, circa 
1904. 
of under 30,000 people. Further, as a Brisbane visitor had 
commented six years earlier, "the streets are particularly clean".^* 
In 1903, however, 157 cases of typhoid and 82 of enteric fever 
were reported. In the first decade of the twentieth century there 
were 2000 cases of enteric and 457 typhoid victims.^^ It is likely 
that they were casualties of cross-infection from the mines. 
The Royal Commision reported in 1911 that sixteen Charters 
Towers mines, employing from 555 to ten men, were inspected. 
The largest of these, the Brilliant Extended which had 127 men 
above and 428 below ground, had a total of thirteen "conveniences" 
with pans a mere thirteen by thirteen inches. Since they were emptied 
only once a week by the Council's sanitary contractor, it is 
understandable that they did not pass inspection. Seven of them 
were on the surface, about thirty yards from the change rooms. 
They were all earth closets and only five were provided with sawdust 
and ashes for deodorizing. Underground, the other six were 
galvanised iron pans placed up to eighteen inches below the planks 
which formed their seats, they were sited in the dead ends of the 
levels where no provision for disinfectants or deodorants was 
considered necessary. In crib areas, wooden boxes were provided 
to collect food scraps. However the inspectors reported that the 
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boxes were apparently not used since the floors were littered with 
bread. Change houses were considered clean, though only three 
showers were provided. 
The great Mills Day Dawn United mine had only three toilets 
above and five below ground. Those in the dead ends and worked-
out cross-cuts consisted only of a pan with a plank to stand on. 
The pansteads and seats of the surface earth closets and the floor 
surrounding the underground pans were fouled. The mine also had 
one urinal which consisted of an enamel basin leading through 
an open channel to the street. Its two change houses contained 
five showers each. Both these and the crib areas were judged by 
the Commissioners to be dirty. 
The New Queen Cross, the Bonnie Dundee, Marshah's Queen, 
the Day Dawn PC and the Band of Hope had no sanitary 
conveniences underground. On the surface the Bonnie Dundee and 
the Day Dawn Block and Wyndham both relied on cess-pits. Almost 
all were described as "bad", "fouled" or "offensive"."" Similarly 
no bathing or washing arrangements were provided in the change-
houses at the Band of Hope, Bonnie Dundee or Day Dawn Block 
and Wyndham mines."' 
It is not surprising given the numbers of men using mine facilities 
and the high temperatures of Charters Towers that the 
Commissioners were dismayed by their discoveries. They 
commented that "a badly constructed or filthily kept privy is liable 
to pollute the persons or clothing of those using it, and the presence 
of a typhoid carrier amongst these may result in infection of others. 
Men are deterred from using such a place, the result being that 
parts of the workings are fouled with excreta. ""2 What they did 
not mention was the futility of sanitary controls in the town when 
thousands of men moved daily between the mines and their homes. 
It is hkely that many of the typhoid victims, regardless of age, 
sex or occupation, were in truth casualties of the mines. 
MINER'S PHTHISIS 
Despite the greater danger of contracting typhoid in this 
environment, community fears focussed on chest complaints and 
particularly miners' phthisis. It was this disease that the Royal 
Commission was set up to investigate. Despite considerable 
confusion about terminology, doctors generally accepted that 
phthisis cases feU into two major categories: non-turberculous and 
turberculous. The former was a non-contagious disease caused by 
the mechanical action of silica particles on the respiratory system. 
In its early stages these particles attacked the lining of the bronchi, 
the destruction of which in turn facilitated the penetration of the 
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lung tissue itself. In the lung the jagged edges caused a low, chronic 
inflamation which promoted the growth of fibrous tissue to envelop 
the irritating particles. This tissue was not fed by blood vessels 
and, indeed, interfered with the working of vessels feeding the host 
tissue, and therefore with the respiratory process. As fresh dust 
was absorbed more fibrous tissue was formed and small areas of 
the lung were separated off and ceased to function. 
The onset of the disease was insidious; only after irremediable 
damage had been done did definite symptoms present themselves. 
The early signs were frequently recurring coughs and mild attacks 
of bronchitis in men whose general health appeared to be good. 
This situation could last for some years before the miner began 
to notice that he was short of breath. The breathlessness increased 
until, even when resting, the sufferer wheezed and the slightest 
exertion caused stridor and hurried breathing. By this stage the 
miner had been forced to leave work and indeed was incapable 
of any physical labour. However, when deaths occurred they were 
normally due to lung infections, particularly to tuberculosis, which 
the fibrous organs were no longer able to combat."^ 
The miners showed some reluctance about reporting symptoms 
of phthisis. Publicity about it scared them and indeed produced, 
in some, a degree of hypochondria."" Others concealed symptoms 
for fear of losing their jobs. The Commissioners noted this and 
wrote that "the men were not disposed to assist the work of the 
Commission in this respect"."5 Accordingly, reluctance to 
acknowledge phthisis combined with the problems of mobility and 
diagnosis to make their statistics dubious. Moreover the complexity 
of the situation is demonstrated in the Charters Towers register 
of notifiable diseases which lists, for the period 1901 to 1911, thirty-
one cases of tuberculosis in men and fourteen in women as compared 
with eighty-four cases of phthisis in men and twenty-five in women. 
Clearly the number of women contracting phthisis is unexpectedly 
high. Not included in these numbers are several other cases. James 
Walsey's doctor notified the Council that he had pulmonary 
tuberculosis in 1904 but phthisis in 1906. Evan Davies apparently 
had phthisis pulmonaris in 1905 and pulmonary tuberculosis the 
following year. Harry Gardner followed the same course between 
1906 and 1907 while Elizabeth Condon was reported to have 
pulmonary tuberculosis in 1910 but phthisis later the same year."* 
It would therefore seem reasonable to assume that the terms 
"tuberculosis" and "phthisis" were being used interchangeably, not 
only to refer to different forms of silicosis amongst miners, but 
also to describe chest complaints in the community in general. 
Given such problems the Council's list may weU constitute a better 
estimate of the number of victims of the mines since the non-mining 
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community suffered from the dust of the mines and mills as well 
as risking infection from tubercular miners. 
Underground conditions certainly favoured phthisis; during the 
early twentieth century they deteriorated rapidly. Many of the mines 
were dry and blasting operations filled the air with fine, but insoluble 
particles of the granite country rock. Where possible, miners fired 
just before crib or at the end of a shift to allow some of the dust 
to settle before the men returned to the face. However in much 
of the ground it was impossible to fire all holes of a shot at the 
same time and so firing continued over an extended period making 
the dust inescapable. Probably the worst problems were caused 
by the machine drills, particularly when they were used in a rise. 
Rises were greatly favoured as they were much cheaper to cut than 
winzes since material fell away rather than needing to be 
manhandled. It was this falling away of broken rock from the drill 
which constituted such a danger to the miner operating the machine; 
he could hardly avoid inhaling it. Two methods of coping with 
dust in rises were available. Firstly the miner might provide himself 
with a "respirator" — a cloth mask — to protect his mouth and 
nose. However these cost 1/6 to 2/0 each and deteriorated quickly 
as they became clogged with dust and sweat. Further they were 
uncomfortable to wear — one miner told the Commissioners that 
after a few hours in one his lips felt "parboiled"."' The second 
The Charters Towers Stock Exchange in 1891. The winning and losing of fortunes 
attracted more attention than public health. 
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possibility was to use water sprays or jets attached to the drills 
themselves. The use of water to lay the dust was considered effective, 
but Charters Towers temperatures often turned the water to vapour 
which the miners found more unpleasant than the dust itself. 
AN ATMOSPHERE OF DUST 
At the root of the heat and dust problems was the ventilation 
system. This was the area which suffered most from the short-
sightedness of the Charters Towers directorates, which for so long 
had sunk shafts without consideration for future air circulation. 
Almost all the ventilation on the field was effected by what were 
somewhat euphemistically called "natural methods": air entered the 
mine through a downcast and left through an upcast shaft, without 
mechanical assistance."^ At best, due to the high surface 
temperatures, the system was inefficient. In mines with only one 
shaft it was impossible. On other fields single shafts were divided 
into separate compartments to provide an upcast and a downcast, 
but the size of the Charters Towers shafts usually precluded this 
practice. Indeed, in 1901 Wilham Blane, a South African mining 
engineer, had commented on "ridiculously small shafts, which would 
be quite inadequate for the proper ventilation of the mines even 
if filled with the best known appliances","^ and as late as 1912, 
when there were twenty shafts between 1,500 and 3,000 feet deep 
on the Brilliant and Day Dawn reef systems, their aggregate 
unimpeded downcast was only 123 square feet.5'5 
Clearly the solution lay in connecting the underground workings 
of adjacent mines to co-ordinate the use of their shafts. This system 
gave rise to many problems, one of which was tragically 
demonstrated during the underground fire which virtually ended 
the life of the Brilliant PC in October 1904. Carbon monoxide 
generated by burning mine timbers travelled through the 
underground connections to kill three miners in the Brilliant Block 
and another three in the Mexican, as well as a member of the 
rescue team.5' Lack of co-operation between the managers of the 
connected mines was common as each manager naturally wanted 
his shaft to be used as the downcast. To this end they resorted 
to a variety of dubious practices such as hanging doors in their 
levels to interfere with the ventilation of neighbouring mines.52 
The respective managers of the Brilhant Extended and the Brilliant 
Deep Levels took advantage of the 1911 Commission to lay 
complaints about each other before the pubhc.53 
The most serious effects of such disagreements were felt by miners 
working in the deep levels and the dead ends of these mines. The 
Mining Inspector recorded temperatures of up to 110 degrees in 
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the Brilliant Extended which, with a vertical shaft of 2,800 feet, 
was the biggest employer of underground miners on the field. He 
reported that "the conditions under which some of these men have 
to work must be highly injurious to them", and added that "in 
most places the air was so heavily charged with dust that it was 
almost impossible to enter them."5" By 1911 several mines were 
so hot in places that their men could only work for ten minute 
periods, "cooling off" at the plat in between. In the Brilhant Deeps, 
where in 1906 150 men worked nearly 3,000 feet underground, the 
only air came through a single shaft of three four-foot square 
compartments and it was commonplace for men to faint at the 
face.55 
Conditions in the mines were, then, ideal for the development 
of fibrosis. However, the miner was not the only member of the 
community whose lungs were being prepared to host the tuberculosis 
bacihus. The mills of Charters Towers, operating under a constant 
shortage of water, were also full of granite dust. Further, the 
transport of quartz through the town by horse dray brought the 
problem into the streets. Oral sources describe a layer of "fine 
dust" covering the street between the mills and the cyanide works, 
and Warden Parkinson wrote in 1903 that the town was "continually 
enveloped in dust."56 This would no doubt have weakened the lungs 
of non-miners, enhancing the likelihood of infection. Even without 
the dust it would have been impossible to prevent the spread of 
tubercular infection to the families of the miners and thence into 
the community at large. 
The victims of accidents, mine sanitation and even the "miners' 
complaint", in Charters Towers at least, were not restricted to the 
miners. To an even greater extent they were not restricted to the 
still-working miners who were examined by the Royal Commission 
of 1911. In matters pertaining to health and well-being, the mining 
community consisted of every member of the mining town. Hence 
it was not possible to draw conclusions about the condition of 
the miners of Charters Towers in isolation from that of other 
residents. 
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